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BILL ATKIN: A FIERCE DEFENDER OF 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND PROPONENT 
OF CHILD-FOCUSED LEGISLATION 
Mark Henaghan* and Ruth Ballantyne** 
This article illustrates the different ways in which Professor Bill Atkin has shown where family law 
legislative reforms have fallen short in making the rights and well-being of children the paramount 
consideration in family law disputes, and properly taking account of children's views on matters 
that affect them. It examines Atkin's thought-provoking analysis of the introduction of the Care of 
Children Act 2004 and the changes made in recent years to the Child Support Act 1991, the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and the Family Court system as a whole. The article also 
explores Atkin's approval of the amendments to the Crimes Act 1961 preventing parents from using 
physical discipline against their children for the purposes of correction. Overall, the article 
highlights Atkin's extensive contribution to family law and demonstrates what needs to be changed 
to ensure New Zealand family law and society becomes more child-focused in the future. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Professor Bill Atkin has long argued that the rights and well-being of children should be the 
principal focus of family law. This strongly held view is at the centre of his wide-ranging and 
perceptive writing on family law affecting children. Atkin believes that it is unfortunate that issues 
often "turn out to be between adults, with the child the mere subject-matter".1 To this end, Atkin has 
been at the forefront of critical legislative analysis for several decades. He has been tireless in his 
call for family law legislation to better recognise the rights and views of children, and to ensure their 
welfare and best interests are truly the first and paramount consideration. This is particularly 
important work in a society where children have no individual political power of their own and are 
solely reliant on adults to improve their legal position. 
  
*  Professor and Dean of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. 
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wish to thank Summer Research Scholar Jonathon Yeldon for his invaluable research and editorial 
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1  Bill Atkin "Children and Financial Aspects of Family Breakdown" (2002) BFLJ 85 at 85. 
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This article illustrates the different ways in which Atkin has shown where family law legislative 
reforms have fallen short in making the rights and well-being of children the paramount 
consideration in family law disputes, and properly taking account of children's views on matters that 
affect them. This involves an examination of Atkin's thought-provoking analysis of the introduction 
of the Care of Children Act 2004 and the changes made in recent years to the Child Support Act 
1991, the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and the Family Court system as a whole. The article 
also explores Atkin's approval of the amendments to the Crimes Act 1961 preventing parents from 
using physical discipline against their children for the purposes of correction. Overall, the article 
highlights Atkin's extensive contribution to family law and demonstrates what needs to be changed 
to ensure New Zealand family law and society becomes more child-focused in the future. 
II CARE OF CHILDREN ACT 2004 
The Care of Children Act 2004 has been in force for over a decade and is generally considered 
to be more child-focused than its predecessor, the Guardianship Act 1968. Indeed the stated purpose 
of the Care of Children Act 2004 is extremely child-focused:2 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to— 
(a) promote children's welfare and best interests, and facilitate their development, by helping 
to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for their guardianship and care; and 
(b) recognise certain rights of children. 
However, when the current Care of Children Act 2004 was first introduced to Parliament as the 
Care of Children Bill 2003,3 Atkin argued that the proposed legislation did "not go nearly as far as it 
could" in terms of providing sufficient legal recognition to the welfare, best interests and rights of 
children, especially in terms of children's views and their involvement in medical decision making. 
These issues are discussed in turn below. 
A Children's Views 
Clause 5 of the original Care of Children Bill required that "a child must be given a chance to 
express views on matters affecting the child",4 and that "any views the child expresses (either 
directly or through a representative) must be taken into account".5 Despite this proposed provision, 
which was a significant improvement upon the Guardianship Act 1968, Atkin advocated for 
  
2  Care of Children Act 2004, s 3(1). 
3  Care of Children Bill 2003 (54-1). 
4  Care of Children Bill 2003 (54-1), cl 5(a). The wording of s 6(2)(a) of the current Care of Children Act 
2004 is similar to cl 5(a) of the original Bill, with the only significant alteration being that the phrase "given 
a chance" was changed to "given reasonable opportunities". 
5  Care of Children Bill (54-1), cl 5(b). The wording of s 6(2)(b) of the current Care of Children Act 2004 is 
identical to cl 5(b) of the original Bill. 
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Parliament to give children's views a more central place in the legislation.6 Atkin noted that parents 
ultimately made decisions for children and that they could completely ignore their children's views 
when doing so, concluding that one therefore could "be forgiven for thinking that the Bill 
remain[ed] a largely adult-focused piece of legislation, rather than a child-centred one".7 Moreover, 
he noted that the Bill similarly did not "stop a Court from bypassing a child's views", made "no 
presumption in favour of a child's views",8 and did not contain a mechanism "for ensuring that the 
child's views are genuinely heard".9  
After hearing submissions on such issues by Atkin and others, the second incarnation of the 
Care of Children Bill did alter the exact wording used to increase the ability of children to be 
heard.10 The wording contained in cl 5(a) of the original Bill stating that children "must be given a 
chance" to express their views,11 was modified by the Select Committee and became children "must 
be given reasonable opportunities to express views".12 This alteration was a significant 
improvement because the use of the word "opportunities" implied that children would be given more 
than one chance to express their views. This wording endures to the current day, where s 6(2) of the 
current Care of Children Act 2004 requires a child to be "given reasonable opportunities to express 
views on matters affecting the child" by the court.13 
However, Atkin's wider criticisms were not addressed, and the deficiencies that he identified in 
the Bill remained true after the passing of the Care of Children Act 2004. Parents and the court can 
still choose to bypass children's views (or may merely pay lip-service to the views held by children), 
especially when particularly young children are involved.  
Such an approach was expressly permitted under the former Guardianship Act 1968 because s 
23(2) of the Act identified a child's "age and maturity" as relevant factors in determining the weight 
to be given to a child's wishes. However, this was omitted from the Care of Children Act 2004 
because it made it "too easy to dismiss young children's views" because the children were deemed to 
be "immature".14  
  
6  Bill Atkin "The Care of Children Bill" [2004] NZLJ 44. 
7  At 44. 
8  At 44. 
9  At 45. 
10  Care of Children Bill 2003 (54-2). 
11  Care of Children Bill 2003 (54-1), cl 5(a). 
12  Care of Children Bill 2003 (54-2), cl 5(a). 
13  Care of Children Act 2004, s 6(2)(a). 
14  Mark Henaghan "Case Note: Children's Views – Two Steps Forwards, One Step Backwards" (2006) 5 
NZFLJ 154 at 154. 
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Despite these reforms and the Care of Children Act 2004's improved focus on children's views, a 
disconnect remains between the wording and purpose of the legislation, and its application. For 
example, in C v S, Randerson J found that a child's age and maturity were still relevant in 
determining the weight to be given to their views.15 Further, he dismissed the failure to ask a four 
year old for her views as immaterial on the basis that these could not have reasonably affected the 
outcome of the case. The Court of Appeal agreed, saying:16 
[T]he purpose of the exercise is associated with outcomes and not just process … Despite the generality 
of the language of s 6, it must be applied in a sensible way. There is not much point in requiring a Court 
to ascertain the views of a child who is not capable of having or forming a view which is material. As to 
this, we see some flexibility in the expression "reasonable opportunities". We accept, as Randerson J 
did, that even a child as young as four could have and express views which might be material to her care 
arrangements and which therefore ought to be taken into account when decisions are being made about 
those arrangements. But a child of five (which is how old she now is) could hardly be expected to have 
and express views which would be material to the issue … In those circumstances we concluded that it 
was not necessary for us to seek the views of the child in relation to the current application. 
How can a court predetermine that a child's views are immaterial, when it has not even heard 
what that child's views are? Listening to children's views is not primarily about determining the 
outcome of the case. Rather, obtaining the child's views is "to show respect to the person who the 
decision is about".17 With that in mind, it is understandable why Atkin has critiqued the Care of 
Children Act 2004 for essentially allowing the child's views to "be completely ignored".18 Ignoring 
children does not respect their views, as the legislation was designed to do.19  
B The Rights of Children 
1 Children's rights generally 
Atkin also expressed concern that the stated purpose of the original Care of Children Bill did not 
contain any reference to the rights of the child, despite the fact that the explanatory note 
  
15  C v S [2006] 3 NZLR 420 (HC). 
16  C v S CA115/06, 18 October 2006 at [6] and [9]. 
17  Henaghan, above n 14, at 154. 
18  Bill Atkin "Harmonising Family Law" (2006) 37 VUWLR 465 at 479. Atkin's prophetic words were borne 
out by a study of 120 Family Court decisions where children's views were completely omitted from the 
judgments in 28 per cent of all of the cases studied. See Antoinette Robinson and Mark Henaghan 
"Children: Heard But Not Listened To? An Analysis of Children's Views Under s 6 of the Care of Children 
Act 2004" (2011) 7 NZFLJ 39 at 41. 
19  Care of Children Act 2004, s 3(2)(c). 
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accompanying the Bill listed "ensuring a stronger focus on the rights of the child" as one of the 
primary objectives of the Bill.20 As Atkin stated:21 
The "Purpose of this Act" as set out in cl 3 of the Bill does not mention the rights of the child at all … 
There is therefore a somewhat amazing gulf between the Explanatory Note and the official "purpose" of 
the legislation. While respect for children's views may indirectly enhance their rights, those views can be 
ignored. Others make the decisions. 
However, this issue was successfully resolved in the Bill as reported by the Select Committee, 
with the insertion of cl 3(1)(b).22 The express purpose of the legislation became to "promote 
children's welfare and best interests" and "recognise certain rights of children". This addition was as 
a direct result of submissions received by the Justice and Electoral Committee. As the Select 
Committee report states:23 
We recommend an amendment to clause 3 to clarify that the bill recognises certain rights of children. 
Several submissions supported the addition of a reference to children's rights. 
This illustrates the importance of academics and others making submissions to select 
committees about proposed legislation involving children in order to effect positive change. 
2 Children's rights and guardianship decisions 
Atkin has long advocated for New Zealand legislation involving children to directly address the 
1985 decision of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHB from the United Kingdom, where the 
House of Lords found that children's powers to make their own decisions gradually increase as they 
mature, rather than arbitrarily occurring at a prescribed age.24 As Atkin said of Gillick:25 
The majority of the House took the position that children gradually gain greater decision-making power 
as they grow older and the role of parents correspondingly wanes. Thus, children have the right to 
decide many things for themselves, depending on the nature of the issue and depending on their 
individual level of maturity. 
  
20  Care of Children Bill (54-1) (explanatory note) at 2. 
21  Atkin, above n 6, at 44. 
22 Care of Children Bill (54-2). 
23  Care of Children Bill (54-2) (select committee report) at 1. 
24  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 (HL). 
25  Atkin, above n 6, at 45. 
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When the decision was released in 1985, Atkin argued that the case was applicable under New 
Zealand law and described it as a "historic" win for "the supporters of children's rights".26 Two 
years later, in January 1987, Atkin submitted that the Children and Young Persons Bill 198627 
(which ultimately became the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989) "should take 
account of the House of Lords' decision in Gillick".28 Regrettably, Atkin's criticisms were not heard. 
Atkin noted that the Care of Children Act 2004 was a further missed "opportunity to determine 
the place of Gillick in the law",29 despite the fact that the Act did subtly incorporate some related 
principles. As Atkin said: "There are a couple of modest signals in the description of the role of 
guardians that something of the Gillick philosophy has crept through."30 Atkin notes that s 16(1) of 
the Act states that it is the role of the guardian to contribute to a child's development and to 
determine "for or with the child, or [help] the child to determine, questions about important matters 
affecting the child".31 However, Atkin emphasises that the Act gives minors autonomy at "an 
arbitrary age", rather than due to "their level of maturity."32  
To illustrate, Atkin notes that, with the exception of a young woman having the right to decide 
whether to have an abortion, the Care of Children Bill (which after some modification became the 
Care of Children Act 2004) gave children rights to consent or to refuse to consent to medical 
procedures based on "the arbitrary age limit of 16 and by the range of procedures specified".33 
Those under the age of 16 are left in limbo, with no satisfactory guidelines as to how their 
competence to decide should be determined. In the end, decisions have to fall back on the test set 
out by Lord Scarman in Gillick – does the young person have "sufficient intelligence and 
understanding" to make the decision that they want to make?34  
It would have been more helpful if the Care of Children Act 2004 had incorporated some 
guidelines directly based on Gillick, such as a requirement for a prescribed sufficient level of 
  
26  Bill Atkin "A Blow for the Rights of the Child: Mrs Gillick in the House of Lords" (1985) 1 FLB 35. See 
also Atkin, above n 6, at 45, where Atkin states that the decision "was a major strike in favour of children's 
rights". 
27  Children and Young Persons Bill 1986 (97-1). 
28  Bill Atkin "Submission to the Social Services Select Committee on the Children and Young Persons Bill 
1986" at 4. 
29  Atkin, above n 18, at 479. 
30  At 479. 
31  Care of Children Act 2004, s 16(1)(c). 
32  Atkin, above n 18, at 479. 
33  Atkin, above n 6, at 45. 
34  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA, above n 24, at 114. 
 BILL ATKIN: A FIERCE DEFENDER OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND PROPONENT OF CHILD-FOCUSED LEGISLATION 597 
 
 
understanding by the child. Clear guidelines would have assisted health professionals to determine 
when, and the degree to which, particular children should have the right to be more involved in 
important medical decisions. Such an approach would have been more in keeping with Atkin's 
strong view that "children's rights must be given a central place in any attempt at harmonising the 
law".35 
3 Children's right to bring proceedings 
Atkin has also critiqued the Care of Children Act 2004 for not giving children generally "any 
right to initiate proceedings", although he notes "there is an exception in section 31(2) which 
enables the child to ask to be placed under the guardianship of the court".36 Children over the age of 
16 may also apply to a Family Court judge seeking review of their parent's decision about an 
important guardianship matter.37 However, Atkin questioned this arbitrary age requirement being 
placed on a child's ability to initiate such proceedings by cl 40 of the original Care of Children Bill 
(and ultimately s 46C of the Care of Children Act 2004).38 Atkin questioned why a "mature 15-year-
old" should not be able to seek a review of a parent's decision and why a child of any age should not 
be able to do so through a representative.39  
Children can also technically seek leave from the court to bring proceedings granting them, for 
example, contact with a particular individual.40 However, as Atkin rightly pointed out when the Bill 
was originally proposed, why should children need leave to make an application to the Family Court 
"when the Bill is supposed to be about children".41 Sadly, this issue was not addressed and remains 
a problem today.42 
III CHILD SUPPORT ACT 1991 
A Adult Focused Legislation 
Atkin has also critiqued the Child Support Act 1991 for not being sufficiently child-focused. His 
main criticism is that the Act focuses on "the financial support of the child" and not "the best 
  
35  Atkin, above n 18, at 479. 
36  At 479. 
37  See Care of Children Bill (54-1), cl 40; and Care of Children Act 2004, s 46C. 
38  Atkin, above n 6, at 45. 
39  At 45. 
40  See Care of Children Bill (54-1), cl 43; and Care of Children Act 2004, s 47. 
41  Atkin, above n 6, at 45. 
42  The Care of Children Act 2004 does allow children to appeal some decisions as of right, but requires leave 
of the court to appeal other matters. See Care of Children Act 2004, s 143. It is important to note that the 
Act does not provide a legislative mechanism for an appeal brought by a child to be paid for.  
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interests of the child".43 He notes that although the Act "can impact on other family law situations 
and uses the Family Court for resolution of disputes", it is "largely isolated" from other areas of 
family law that affect children.44 Atkin explains that the legislation "is designed to make parents pay 
for their children, irrespective of the nature of the relationship between the payer and the child".45 
He emphasises that the Act does not "[encourage] the financial parent to become a real parent" and 
does not provide incentive for "the custodian to encourage the absent parent to become active in the 
child's life".46 It is a purely revenue gathering statute focused on recouping money, rather than on 
the well-being of children. 
Atkin has identified several aspects of the Child Support Act 1991 that fail to advance the child's 
welfare. Most significantly, he explains that the Child Support Act 1991 "does not incorporate the 
principle that the welfare and best interests of the child are to be paramount".47 Atkin notes that this 
omission is contrary to art 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
requires the child's best interests to be a primary consideration in all matters that affect children.48 
He explains that the Court in A v R49 even found that "there is no warrant, for importing, as a matter 
of principle, any 'welfare of the child' test into [the appointment of a step-parent under] s 
99(4)(a)".50 Atkin emphasises that this ruling illustrates just "how out of step the Child Support Act 
1991 is with fundamental family law and international principles".51 Further, he notes that the 
revisions made to the Child Support Act 1991 by the Child Support Amendment Bill 201152 (which 
went on to become the Child Support Amendment Act 2013) did not remedy this problem as it 
failed to incorporate the welfare of the child as a primary consideration.53 The Child Support Act 
1991 still does not require the welfare and best interests of the child to be a primary or paramount 
consideration. 
  
43  Bill Atkin and Andrew Black "Child Support – Supporting Whom?" (1999) 30 VUWLR 221 at 221. 
44  Bill Atkin "A trio of child support cases" (2008) 6 NZFLJ 107 at 107. 
45  Atkin and Black, above n 43, at 228. 
46  At 228. 
47  Atkin, above n 44, at 107. 
48  At 107. Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990). 
49  A v R [1999] NZFLR 249 (HC). 
50  Atkin, above n 44, at 107. 
51  Atkin and Black, above n 43, at 228. 
52  Child Support Amendment Bill 2011 (337-2). 
53  Bill Atkin "Financial Support: Who Supports Whom?" in Bill Atkin and Mark Henaghan (eds) Family Law 
Policy in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) 163 at 194. 
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Atkin notes that the courts have raised questions about the relationship between financial 
support and the welfare of the child, despite the legislation failing to incorporate the welfare 
principle into the application of the Child Support Act 1991. He focuses on three cases that "bring 
into question the implementation of the child support scheme, but more fundamentally typify the 
extensive shortcomings of the legislation".54 One of these cases actually reads the welfare principle 
into the legislation. In C v L [Child abduction] Allan J states:55 
The statutory regime is plainly based on the fundamental assumption that the welfare of children trumps 
all else; whatever the shortcomings of the regime in its application from case to case, Parliament must 
be presumed to have concluded that the welfare of children is paramount. 
This finding aligns closely with Atkin's own steadfast view that child support cases need to 
focus on the impact the decision will have on the child, rather than merely on how best to collect 
revenue from the liable parent.56 This would be easier for the courts to achieve if the Child Support 
Act 1991 was amended to include the welfare principle. 
Atkin believes that it is unfortunate that children do not have any right to the child support 
payment themselves. First, he emphasises that a child has no express power to obtain their own 
support,57 reasoning that this "perhaps illustrates the cynical view that [the Act] is more about adults 
and 'taxation without representation' than the welfare of children".58 Atkin explains that this is 
another problem that the changes to the Child Support Act 1991 failed to address.59 
Secondly, Atkin emphasises that "[t]here is no obligation on the custodian to spend the money 
on the child", taking this as further evidence that "the child support scheme is not child-focused, but 
adult-focused".60 He observes that while the changes introduced a provision that enables a parent to 
directly make "qualifying" payments for goods and services that benefit the child, this is the only 
provision that ensures that the money is spent on the child. Further, Atkin explains that it will only 
apply in limited circumstances and the receiving parent is otherwise free to spend payments as they 
  
54  Atkin, above n 44, at 109. In this article Atkin examines three decisions that illuminate the significant 
shortcomings of the Child Support Act 1991: C v L [Child abduction] [2008] NZFLR 960 (HC); 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue Department v DJP FC Tauranga FAM-2004-070-813, 21 July 2008; and 
Inland Revenue Department v C [2009] NZFLR 19 (FC).  
55  C v L [Child abduction], above n 54, at [47]. 
56  See Atkin, above n 44.  
57  Atkin, above n 1, at 89; and Atkin, above n 53, at 181. 
58  Atkin, above n 53, at 181. 
59  At 194–195. 
60  Atkin, above n 1, at 89.  
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wish.61 Ultimately, the child has no right to the money that concerns them, which only shows how 
legislation that is supposed to benefit children really is about adult considerations. 
B Recent Changes 
Atkin has long expressed the view that the child support system should be re-examined.62 He 
has even suggested that "a complete overhaul of the Act may be required".63 Significant changes to 
the Child Support Act 1991 were put into motion by the Child Support Amendment Act 2013, the 
majority of which came into force in April 2015.64 However, following the introduction of the 
proposed changes (originally as the Child Support Amendment Bill 2011, which went on to become 
the Child Support Amendment Act 2013), Atkin recognised that the scheme still remained focused 
on "formulaic assessment, departures and enforcement".65 He emphasised that while the reform was 
"the most significant" one to date, it was "not a complete overhaul" as he originally envisaged.66 
The biggest change to the child support system was the introduction of a new formula for 
calculating the rate of child support to be paid. As Atkin explains: "The most momentous of the 
reforms in the Amendment Bill [was] the recalibration of the formula."67 The new formula came 
into force on 1 April 2015,68 and is significantly different to the formula contained in the old 
scheme.  
The new formula considers the income of both parties for the first time. It calculates each 
parent's "child support income amount" using their taxable incomes as the basis for this. However, 
deductions are made for a living allowance, a dependent child allowance, and a "multi-group 
  
61  Atkin, above n 53, at 196. This provision was included in the Child Support Amendment Act 2013. Section 
38 of the Amendment Act will insert a new s 131 into the Child Support Act 1991 when that part of the 
Amendment Act comes into force on 1 April 2016. 
62  Atkin and Black, above n 43, at 236. 
63  Atkin, above n 44, at 109. 
64  Sections 6, 31 and 32 of the Child Support Amendment Act 2013 (concerning transitional and savings 
provisions) came into force on 17 April 2013. Sections 18, 19, and 19A of the Amendment Act (concerning 
exemptions for long-term patients and prisoners, and individuals who earn additional income while 
otherwise exempt) came into force on 1 April 2014. The rest of pt 1 of the Amendment Act not already in 
force (including the new formula used for calculating child support) came into force on 1 April 2015. Part 2 
of the Amendment Act (which concerns departures from formula assessment, collection, penalties and 
relief) will come into force on 1 April 2016. See Child Support Amendment Act 2013, s 2. 
65  Atkin, above n 53, at 190. 
66  At 191. 
67  At 192. 
68  Child Support Amendment Act 2013, ss 2(3) and pt 1.  
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allowance" for a parent who has had children with different partners.69 Then each parent's "income 
percentage" is:70   
… derived by dividing the person's child support income amount (as determined under section 34) by 
the sum of the child support income amounts, in relation to that child, of all the parents of the child. 
This approach contrasts with the old model, which as Atkin explains, failed to acknowledge 
"that women are increasingly in the paid workforce" and "that fathers are more involved in caring 
for their children than in the past".71 
Further, the new scheme better recognises shared parenting. Under the original Child Support 
Act 1991, a person other than the "principal provider" was only deemed to "share ongoing daily care 
of the child substantially equally" if they had care of the child for 40 per cent of the nights.72 
However, recent changes introduced by the Child Support Amendment Act 2013 are far less 
onerous in that the notion of shared care has been expanded to include a lower proportion of a 
child's daily care. A liable parent who provides "at least 28% of ongoing daily care to the child" may 
not have to pay any child support if their income percentage is equal to their "care cost 
percentage".73 The Commissioner of Inland Revenue determines a parent's "care cost percentage" 
by consulting a table in sch 2.74 In determining a parent's "proportion of ongoing daily care", the 
Commissioner is to "rely on the content of any care order or agreement relating to a qualifying 
child".75  
The new formula also takes into account the age of the children concerned. As Atkin explains: 
"The new formula recognises that a teenager costs more to feed and clothe than a younger child. 
Thus a liable parent pays more for a child aged 13 or over."76 It considers the "child expenditure 
amount" for a qualifying child, which is based on the age group of the child, as well as other 
  
69  See s 34 of the Child Support Act 1991, as amended by s 12 of the Child Support Amendment Act 2013 on 
1 April 2015. 
70  See s 33 of the Child Support Act 1991, as amended by s 12 of the Child Support Amendment Act 2013 on 
1 April 2015. 
71  Atkin, above n 53, at 193. 
72  See s 13 of the Child Support Act 1991 as at 7 December 2014 (not the latest version). 
73  See s 31(1)(b) of the Child Support Act 1991, as amended by s 12 of the Child Support Amendment Act 
2013 on 1 April 2015. 
74  See s 16 of the Child Support Act 1991, as amended by s 10 of the Child Support Amendment Act 2013 on 
1 April 2015. 
75  See s 15(1) of the Child Support Act 1991, as amended by s 10 of the Child Support Amendment Act 2013 
on 1 April 2015. 
76  Atkin, above n 53, at 194. 
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factors.77 Atkin explains that this aspect of the new formula aims to consider "the costs of bringing 
up children rather than the liable parent's income and the simple number of children."78 
As well as the significant changes to the formula used for calculating the appropriate amount of 
child support to be paid, reforms that will be brought into force on 1 April 2016 by the Child 
Support Amendment Act 2013 will be more sympathetic to parents who incur penalties as a result of 
falling into arrears with child support payments. Atkin explains that the impending change "reduces 
the imposition of penalties and eases the circumstances when penalties can be written off".79 He 
uses the future s 135FA of the Child Support Act 1991 as an example.80 This section will allow the 
Commissioner to "grant relief to the liable person" if they are satisfied that recovery of the penalties 
would "place the liable person in serious hardship" or "involve an inefficient use of the 
Commissioner's resources".81 According to Atkin, these changes may reduce the number of child 
support defaulters who "escape their situation by leaving the country, which helps neither the family 
nor the taxpayer".82 
In terms of the totality of the reforms, Atkin reasoned that many of the changes introduced 
seemed fair and appropriate "when looked at individually".83 However, he has expressed 
understandable concern that, "when the overall picture is considered, the full impact of the changes 
is not so easy to discern".84 In particular, he criticised the new formula for being excessively 
complex. As Atkin rightly states:85 
[T]he detailed mathematical formula … is very hard to understand. Lawyers working in the field have 
had trouble making it work. Whether the general public will cope on their own is questionable. Given 
that the formula is linked to a computerised programme, this will simplify the actual calculation, but: (i) 
as a matter of principle, the law dealing with children should surely be reasonably accessible; and (ii) 
how fair the new formula will really be in practice is not easy to determine. 
  
77  See s 30(2) of the Child Support Act 1991, as amended by s 12 of the Child Support Amendment Act 2013 
on 1 April 2015. 
78  Atkin, above n 53, at 194. 
79  At 192. 
80  At 192. 
81  See s 135FA of the Child Support Act 1991, as will be amended by s 43 of the Child Support Amendment 
Act 2013 on 1 April 2016. 
82  Atkin, above n 53, at 192. 
83  At 197. 
84  At 197. 
85  At 192. 
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The child support reforms also do not square with Atkin's focus on the rights and well-being of 
children as the primary consideration in all family law matters affecting children. Atkin emphasised 
that "the principal question to be asked" should really be "whether children will be better off, not 
only the children for whom child support is being paid but also the children for whom the liable 
parent is caring".86 If this is not the case, then as Atkin states, "a more fundamental re-think is 
required".87 This has long been Atkin's position. Prior to the introduction of the current reforms, he 
advocated for research to be undertaken in order to determine whether the scheme was "genuinely 
effective in helping children" as well as their caregivers.88 Despite the recent reforms to the Child 
Support Act 1991, many of the problems that Atkin has identified remain. Therefore it is more 
important than ever to consider how the child support scheme is actually affecting children. Atkin 
leads the charge in the call for the child support system to better account for the rights and well-
being of children. 
IV PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976  
Atkin explains that disputes concerning relationship property, like those concerning child 
support, are "typically between the parents" and are insufficiently child-focused.89 He notes: 
"Children have few rights and their welfare and interests are only of marginal concern."90 When 
Parliament made "significant changes" to the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 in 2001, changing its 
name to the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, Atkin was quick to highlight how the amendments 
related to the welfare of children. He notes that the reforms in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
"contain only passing nods in the direction of children".91 
Section 1M of the Act requires a court "to provide for a just division of the relationship property 
… while taking account of the interests of any children of the marriage or children of the civil union 
or children of the de facto relationship."92 However, Atkin argues that the Act does not meet this 
purpose as children have few rights under its provisions. He explains that they are "not entitled to 
apply under the Act" and have no right to be heard.93 In addition, Atkin notes that while various 
  
86  At 197. 
87  At 197. 
88  Atkin and Black, above n 43, at 236. 
89  Atkin, above n 1, at 85. 
90  At 85. 
91  At 85. 
92  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 1M. 
93  Atkin, above n 1, at 85. 
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persons are entitled to be heard and appear as parties under s 37 of the Act, "it is doubtful whether 
children can take advantage of this".94 
Moreover, children are not adequately represented in the relationship property division process. 
Atkin explains that the court "can appoint a lawyer to represent a child if such an appointment is 
thought necessary or desirable", but states: "One very rarely hears of such appointments being made 
in property disputes."95 This is still an issue in recent times. As Professor Nicola Peart said in 2013, 
the power to appoint a lawyer for children is "seldom utilised".96 She explains that this situation is 
contrary to art 12(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires the child to be 
given an opportunity to be heard in proceedings affecting them.97 
Ultimately, Atkin explains that "the obligation in s 26 to have regard to the children's interests 
has in reality little impact".98 Indeed the Court of Appeal has found that it cannot be used as a 
means of "simply reducing the proper entitlement of one spouse and increasing that of the other".99 
Atkin does note that "the interests of children may affect the actual implementation of the division 
of property" in terms of who is granted occupation of the family home.100 Under s 28A of the Act, 
the court must "have particular regard to the need to provide a home for any minor or dependent 
child" in deciding whether or not to make an occupation order. However, Atkin explains that the 
section "does not, however, exclude other factors from the Court's consideration".101  
Atkin acknowledges that there is an arguably "good reason" that proceedings under the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 are not significantly affected by the court's regard to the children's 
interests.102 This is because the Act is concerned with relationship property that is "owned by one or 
both of the parents", rather than "property owned by the children".103 Such relationship property "is 
divided between the parties on an equal basis" unless there are exceptional circumstances.104 
  
94  At 85. 
95  At 85. 
96  Nicola Peart "Protecting Children's Interests in Relationship Property Proceedings" (2013) 13 Otago LR 27 
at 54. 
97  Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 48, art 12(2). 
98  Atkin, above n 1, at 86. 
99  Coxhead v Coxhead [1993] 2 NZLR 397 (CA) at 408. 
100  Atkin, above n 1, at 86. 
101  At 86. 
102  At 86. 
103  At 86. 
104  At 86. 
 BILL ATKIN: A FIERCE DEFENDER OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND PROPONENT OF CHILD-FOCUSED LEGISLATION 605 
 
 
However, s 26 does contain a power that enables the court to settle property for the benefit of the 
children. Atkin explains that this rule does not in practice undermine the Act 's rationale of equal 
sharing, noting that "the instances where s 26 has been used tend to be rather extreme and usually 
involve some misconduct".105 Indeed Peart notes that the courts only depart from equal sharing if 
they believe that the parties cannot be trusted "to care and provide for their children as best they 
can".106 
Despite some individual sections dealing specifically with children, the Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976 is almost entirely adult-focused. Atkin argues that it is another piece of legislation 
(alongside the Child Support Act 1991) that would benefit from research on the impact that it has on 
"children, families and individuals".107 There are important reasons to heed Atkin's call. Children 
have few rights under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and are not adequately represented. It 
is also problematic that financial considerations tend to overtake the needs of children to have a 
stable home to live in when their parents separate because occupation orders for the benefit of 
children are not prioritised by the Act. Atkin once again leads the charge in this important area of 
family law in his quest for legislation affecting children to be more child-focused. 
V RECENT FAMILY COURT CHANGES  
Atkin was also vocal in his opposition to the changes to the family court system, originally 
proposed by the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill in 2013.108 Atkin's primary concern was 
once again the adult-focused nature of the reforms and the lack of attention paid to the welfare of 
children. As Atkin said: "The law should be child-focused. This Bill is largely adult-focused and 
leaves children at risk."109 
A Lawyer for Child 
Atkin was particularly troubled by the proposed changes to the appointments of lawyer for child 
(that later came into force on 31 March 2014 via the Care of Children Amendment Act (No 2) 
  
105  At 86. 
106  Peart, above n 96, at 51. 
107  Atkin, above n 1, at 90. 
108  After some modification, this Bill ultimately became ten separate Amendment Acts (the majority of which 
came into force on 31 March 2014): the Care of Children Amendment Act (No 2) 2013; the Child Support 
Amendment Act (No 3) 2013; the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Act 2013; the 
Domestic Violence Amendment Act 2013; the Family Courts Amendment Act 2013; the Family Dispute 
Resolution Act 2013; the Family Proceedings Amendment Act (No 2) 2013; the Legal Services Amendment 
Act (No 2) 2013; the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act (No 2) 2013; and the Protection of Personal 
and Property Rights Amendment Act 2013. 
109  Bill Atkin "Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Family Court Proceedings Reform 
Bill" at 4. 
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2013). The original wording of the Care of Children Act 2004 provided that the court "must" 
appoint a lawyer for the child in all cases involving day-to-day care or contact that seemed likely to 
result in a hearing "unless it [was] satisfied the appointment would serve no useful purpose".110 
However, lawyer for child appointments are no longer mandatory. Section 7 of the Care of Children 
Act 2004 now provides that a lawyer for the child "may" only be appointed if the court "has 
concerns for the safety or well-being of the child" and "considers an appointment necessary";111 
wording that Atkin argues is "problematic".112  
Atkin believes that these changes "weakened" the legal representation of children.113 Indeed, he 
said that the proposed changes in terms of when a lawyer for the child was to be appointed were 
"wrong" and would "deny children of their rights".114 Atkin questioned why the Family Court 
Proceedings Reform Bill made lawyer for child appointments discretionary, when mandatory 
appointment had been "regarded as one of the fine hallmarks of our law".115 This is a particularly 
short-sighted change that has more to do with attempting to save money, rather than adequately 
protecting the welfare of children involved in family law processes. 
The insertion of s 7A(5) into the Care of Children Act 2004 also concerns Atkin because it 
prevents a lawyer from acting for a child unless that person has been appointed as a lawyer for the 
child by the court. As Atkin rightly states:116 
This appears to say that children cannot instruct their own lawyers. Only a court-appointed lawyer can 
act for a child. This is highly objectionable and infringes children's rights. While children do not often 
have their own lawyers, they sometimes do and as a matter of principle, should not be denied this 
option. 
Atkin also points out that this limitation prevents older children (16 and older), who wish to 
contest an important decision made by their parent or guardian, from obtaining legal representation 
to assist them in making an application to a Family Court judge under s 46C of the Care of Children 
Act 2004 unless the court has already appointed a lawyer to represent the child.117 
  
110  See s 7 of the Care of Children Act 2013, as at 25 September 2013 (not the latest version). 
111  Care of Children Act 2004, s 7. 
112  Atkin, above n 109 at 7. 
113  At 4. 
114  At 7. 
115  At 7. 
116  At 8. 
117  At 9. 
 BILL ATKIN: A FIERCE DEFENDER OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND PROPONENT OF CHILD-FOCUSED LEGISLATION 607 
 
 
B Other Changes 
Atkin also expressed concern that children's views would be ignored if final parenting orders 
were able to be varied merely by a consent memorandum, rather than having to make a formal 
application to the court. Atkin explained that s 57 of the Care of Children Act 2004 (as then 
proposed) did not require the welfare or views of the children involved in the variation to be 
considered or taken into account by the court. Atkin argued that the section "should be amended to 
provide a mechanism for the child's views to be heard and for a statement about how the variation 
affects the child's welfare and best interests".118 Unfortunately the legislature chose to ignore 
Atkin's plea to make the section more appropriately child-focused and the provision was enacted 
unchanged on 31 March 2014. This was a real backwards step in the fight for better recognition of 
the importance of children's views and the paramountcy of their welfare in family law cases.  
Atkin was also concerned that the new family dispute resolution (FDR) system (as then 
proposed) did not properly "provide for the involvement or representation of the child".119 As Atkin 
states:120 
The second purpose of FDR is to ensure that the children's welfare and best interests are paramount. 
How will this happen? The children are not represented. Who will speak for the children? 
The new FDR system was enacted on 31 March 2014 and has now been up and running for 
some time. FDR providers do now have a duty to "assist the parties to reach an agreement on the 
resolution of those matters that best serves the welfare and best interests of all children involved in 
the dispute".121 This is a good change that clearly enhances children's welfare. However, it appears 
that Atkin's wider concerns are still valid because there are still no formal mechanisms to ensure 
children are properly heard and that their views are independently conveyed during the FDR 
process. Atkin's analysis highlights, that while the rhetoric of the changes was about making the 
process more child focused,122 the reality is quite different. Children remain largely unseen and 
unheard in the FDR process.  
VI CRIMES ACT 1961  
Atkin's strong children's rights stance has been used not just to critique proposed changes to 
legislation, but also to applaud positive legislative changes when they have occurred. To this end, 
  
118  At 10. 
119  At 4. 
120  At 12. 
121  Family Dispute Resolution Act 2013, s 11(2)(c). 
122  Judith Collins "Reforms put children at heart of family law" (25 March 2014) New Zealand Government 
<www.beehive.govt.nz>. 
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Atkin voiced his approval of the repeal of the defence of parental chastisement in s 59 of the Crimes 
Act 1961, calling it "a landmark in the development of the law".123 The former s 59 provided a 
defence to both civil and criminal proceedings if the force used was "reasonable" and "by way of 
correction". However, this section was replaced by a modified s 59, which generally removes 
corporal punishment and instead sets out the occasions where a parent is justified in using 
reasonable force, such as "preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person",124 
"preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive 
behaviour",125 or "performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and 
parenting".126 For example, a parent would be justified in using reasonable force to restrain a child 
who was about to run across the road, or hit their sibling with a hammer.127 Atkin explains that "the 
whole tenor of the new section is about good parenting, not punishment".128 
Atkin argues that such changes were overdue because allowing parents to use physical force 
against their children for the purposes of correction did not adequately recognise the rights of 
children. The use of physical parental discipline is also at odds with current societal values. As 
Atkin states:129 
[T]he old defence of parental discipline was out of step with contemporary developments in the law. The 
repealed version of section 59 preserved an area of immunity for parents that largely ignored the child's 
welfare and safety. 
The new provision means that the law now treats children more like adults in terms of offences 
like assault, in that an individual could be charged with assault if they smack a child for the purpose 
of correction, just as it would be if that individual smacked an adult in a similar fashion. However, 
children and adults are still not treated entirely equally by the law because s 59 allows some leeway 
in terms of the use of physical force towards children in particular circumstances that would not be 
permitted towards adults. In critiquing the reforms on this basis, Atkin suggests that it "may well 
have been better" to have abolished s 59 altogether.130 He states:131 
  
123  Bill Atkin "Section 59 in its Legal Context: Intervening in Family Life" (2008) 12 Childrenz Issues 34 at 34. 
124  Crimes Act 1961, s 59(1)(a). 
125  Section 59(1)(c). 
126  Section 59(1)(d). 
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It is perhaps unfortunate up to a point that the law still enshrines special rules in the criminal code that 
single out the parent-child relationship. After all, one of the arguments for "repeal" was to remove the 
anomaly that what would be an offence if done to an adult escaped because it was done to a child by a 
parent.  
Atkin argues that the law should treat children and adults the same "as far as these kinds of 
offences are concerned".132 This is a strong argument from a children's rights perspective, which is 
consistent with Atkin's stellar work in this important field. 
VII CONCLUSION  
Professor Bill Atkin has made an immense contribution to family law throughout his long and 
distinguished academic career. The consistent theme to Atkin's work is that the rights and views of 
children, and their welfare and best interests, should be central to all aspects of family law and 
family law legislation. Atkin is nothing if not persistent in his fight for children to be more involved 
in decisions about their lives. Atkin's observations are always thoughtful, well-measured and clearly 
illustrate what is really happening. Atkin has shown time and time again the myriad of ways New 
Zealand has failed to deliver legislation that fully recognises and enhances the rights, well-being and 
welfare of children. 
Atkin knows more than most that the welfare of children is often unfortunately under-
represented in politics and their interests appear unlikely to win or lose votes. Therefore it is 
fundamentally important that academics like Atkin say the things that politicians do not wish to hear 
and often choose to ignore. In a future, more child-focused society, Atkin's work will prove to be 
prophetic. In the meantime, we applaud Atkin for his perseverance, and for his consistency in the 
fight for children's rights to be properly implemented within truly child-focused legislation, and for 
children's welfare and views to be respected as the foremost principle of family law. 
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